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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:
Case No. 900180

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

BRYON DALE PETERSON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from defendant's convictions for
aggravated burglary, a first degree felony; two counts of
attempted second degree murder, both second degree felonies; and
being a habitual criminal, after a trial in the Seventh Judicial
District Court.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the lower court abuse its discretion in finding

"good cause" existed for failure to bring the charges against
defendant to trial within 120 days of defendant's request for
disposition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1990)?

An

appellate court will overturn the decision of the lower court
only if it finds the lower court abused its discretion in finding
"good cause" for the matter not being heard within 120 days.
State v. Trujillo, 656 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1982) (per curiam).

2.

Did the lower court properly find defendant's

motion for recusal to be untimely where it was filed during the
first day of trial?

A lower court's findings of fact will not be

set aside on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous.

State v.

Walker, 743 P.2d 191f 192-93 (Utah 1987).
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1990):
77-29-1.

Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending charge Duties of custodial officer - Continuance may be
granted - Dismissal of charge for failure to bring to
trial.
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term
of imprisonment in the state prison, jail, or
other penal or correctional institution of
this state, and there is pending against the
prisoner in this state any untried indictment
or information, and the prisoner shall
deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial
officer in authority, or any appropriate
agent of the same, a written demand
specifying the nature of the charge and the
court wherein it is pending and requesting
disposition of the pending charge, he shall
be entitled to have the charge brought to
trial within 120 days of the date of delivery
of written notice.
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial
officer, upon receipt of the demand described
in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause
the demand to be forwarded by personal
delivery or certified mail, return receipt
requested, to the appropriate prosecuting
attorney and court clerk. The warden,
sheriff or custodial officer shall, upon
request of the prosecuting attorney so
notified, provide the attorney with such
information concerning the term of commitment
of the demanding prisoner as shall be
requested.
(3) After written demand is delivered as
required in Subsection (1), the prosecutor
attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for
good cause shown in open court, with the
prisoner or his counsel being present, may be
granted any reasonable continuance.

(4) In the event the charge is not brought
to trial within 120 days, or within such
continuance as has been granted, and
defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the
action, the court shall review the
proceeding. If the court finds that the
failure of the prosecuting attorney to have
the matter heard within the time required is
not supported by good cause, whether a
previous motion for continuance was made or
not, the court shall order the matter
dismissed with prejudice.
Utah R. Crim. P. 12(d):
Rule 12. Motions.
(d) Failure of the defendant to timely
raise defenses or objections or to make
requests which must be made prior to trial or
at the time set by the court shall constitute
waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown
may grant relief from such waiver.
Utah R. Crim. P. 29(c):
Rule 29. Disability and disqualification of a judge or change of
venue•
(c) If the prosecution or a defendant in
any criminal action or proceeding files an
affidavit that the judge before whom the
action or proceeding is to be tried or heard
as a bias or prejudice, either against the
party or his attorney or in favor of any
opposing party to the suit, the judge shall
proceed no further until the challenge is
disposed of. Every affidavit shall state the
facts and the reasons for the belief that the
bias or prejudice exists and shall be filed
as soon as practicable after the case has
been assigned or the bias or prejudice is
known. No affidavit may be filed unless
accompanied by a certificate of counsel of
record that the affidavit and application are
made in good faith.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with aggravated burglary, a first
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (Supp.

1989); two counts of attempted second degree murder, both second
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-203 and
76-4-101 (Supp. 1989); possession of a dangerous weapon by an
unauthorized person, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (Supp. 1989); and being a habitual
criminal, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (Supp. 1989)
(R. 2-3). Defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary and
both counts of attempted second degree murder after a jury trial
on February 15 and 16, 1990, in the Seventh Judicial District
Court, in and for Emery County, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell,
Judge, presiding (R. 113-15, 158). Additionally, defendant
waived a jury trial and was convicted by Judge Bunnell of being a
habitual criminal (R. 368, 372-73).

The State dismissed the

charge of possession of a dangerous weapon by an unauthorized
person (R. 377). Judge Bunnell sentenced defendant to serve four
consecutive terms of five years to life in the Utah State Prison
(R. 121-22, 375-76).*
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At around midnight on June 3, 1989, Roseanne Jewkes was
walking her dog outside her home in Orangeville, Utah, when she
noticed a pickup truck stopped in the middle of the street
approximately 90 feet away (R. 263, 264, 277). She thought it
The State concedes that Judge Bunnell incorrectly sentenced
defendant to a separate and consecutive term of five years to
life for being a habitual criminal (R. 121-22). See State v.
Stilling, 770 P.2d 137 (Utah 1989); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d
1071 (Utah 1989); State v. Williams, 773 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1989).
Accordingly, this Court should remand this case to the lower
court for resentencing to three consecutive five to life terms,
two of which are enhanced from a second degree felony to a first
degree felony due to defendant's habitual criminal status.

strange that a pickup would be parked in the middle of the street
with its lights off (R. 264). She took the dog off the chain and
proceeded to the edge of the house, hoping she would not be seen
(Id.).

The man driving the truck turned on the engine and

lights, and pulled the vehicle into the Jewkes' driveway (R.
265).
(Jd.).

She positioned herself so that the man could not see her
Assuming the man had gone to the front door, she turned

on her flashlight and hurried into the kitchen through the back
door (Id, ).

There she encountered a man standing in the hallway

(R. 266-67).
Pointing the flashlight in his face, Roseanne
recognized defendant as a former schoolmate (R. 267, 281-82).
Defendant walked toward her, put one hand around her throat, and
a gun against her stomach (R. 267-68).

He said nothing (R. 282).

Fearing for her life, she grabbed for the gun, knocking it away
(R. 268, 269, 274). Defendant placed both hands around her
throat and began to strangle her (R. 268). She screamed for
help, but eventually lost consciousness (R. 268-69).
Lola Jewkes, Roseanne's mother, was asleep in her
bedroom when she was awakened by a scream (R. 290). When she
walked into the kitchen to investigate, defendant grabbed her and
began to punch and choke her (R. 291-92).

Lola saw Roseanne

lying on the floor nearby and thought her daughter was dead.
(jEd.).

Regaining consciousness, Roseanne got to her feet, and

came to her mother's rescue, attacking defendant (R. 293).
In the struggle, defendant knocked Lola against the
stove (R. 293, 298). Picking up the grate from the stove, Lola

hit defendant over the head with it as hard as she could (Icl. ).
Evidently considering the battle lost, defendant began to retreat
(]xi.).

Seeing the gun lying on the cupboard, Roseanne picked it

up and fired at defendant as he went out the back door (R. 271).
Sergeant Norman Vuksinick of the Emery County Sheriff's
Office arrived at 12:22 a.m. (R. 225-26).

Shortly thereafter,

Officer Loury Hansen discovered a trail of blood leading to
defendant lying under a small tree (R. 231). Defendant's shirt
was torn and he had a bullet wound in the left side of his back
(R. 232). Hansen also discovered a gun holster and belt in the
seat of defendant's pickup (R. 236).
On July 10, 1989, defendant delivered a "Notice and
Request for Disposition of Pending Charge(s)" to an agent of the
Utah State Prison (R. 24, 45-46) (see Appendix "A"; Notice and
Request).

A preliminary hearing was held August 3, 1989, at

which time defendant was bound over for trial (R. 1).
Arraignment was held in district court on September 6, 1989 (R.
12).

At the hearing, defendant attempted to fire his appointed

counsel (R. 12, 148) (see Appendices "B" and "C"; Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law; Transcript).

Judge Bunnell set

trial for February 15, 1990, partially to give defendant an
opportunity to reconcile with counsel (R. 149).
On January 5, 1990, defense counsel sought to withdraw
(R. 13-15).

Judge Bunnell denied the motion on January 12, 1990,

appointing co-counsel instead (R. 16).
Defendant moved to dismiss the case on February 7,
1990, on the grounds that he was not brought to trial within 120

days under Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1990).

After a hearing held

on February 14, 1990, Judge Bunnell denied defendant's motion to
dismiss, finding "good cause" for the delay.

(See Appendices "B"

and "C"; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; Transcript).
On February 15, 1990, defendant sought to have Judge
Bunnell recuse himself since he allegedly prosecuted defendant in
1973 (R. 65) (see Appendix "D"; Motion).

Judge Bunnell denied

the motion, finding it to be untimely because he received it
after the time set for commencement of trial (R. 207) (See
Appendix "E"; Transcript).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
"Good cause" existed for Judge Bunnell's denial of
defendant's motion to dismiss where:

(1) the delay in trial was

caused by the need for defendant to reconcile with his defense
counsel; (2) neither defendant nor his counsel objected to the
trial setting; (3) the delay was not caused by the action or
inaction of the prosecution; and (4) no prejudice resulted to
defendant by the delay.
Because defendant's motion to recuse Judge Bunnell was
filed during the first day of trial, Judge Bunnell did not abuse
his discretion in finding defendant's motion untimely.

In any

event, the fact that a judge previously prosecuted a defendant
does not result in a per se disqualification of the judge.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
JUDGE BUNNELL DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION IN
FINDING "GOOD CAUSE" EXISTED FOR NOT BRINGING
DEFENDANT TO TRIAL WITHIN 120 DAYS OF
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION.
Defendant argues that Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1990)
requires dismissal of the charges against him since his trial was
not within 120 days of his notice and request for disposition of
the charges.

Defendant's claim must fail.

Section 77-29-1, whose purpose is "to protect the
constitutional right of prisoners to a speedy trial and to
prevent those charged with enforcement of criminal statutes from
holding over the head of a prisoner undisposed charges against
him," State v. Trujillof 656 P.2d 403, 404 (Utah 1982) (per
curiam), provides that a prisoner serving a term of imprisonment
may upon written demand be entitled to have all pending charges
brought to trial within 120 days.

Subsection (4) provides as

follows:
In the event the charge is not brought to
trial within 120 days, or within such
continuance as has been granted, and the
defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the
action, the court shall review the
proceeding. If the court finds that the
failure of the prosecuting attorney to have
the matter heard within the time required is
not supported by good cause, whether a
previous motion for continuance was made or
not, the court shall order the matter
dismissed with prejudice, [emphasis added.]
Thus, if "good cause" is shown for the failure to bring the
matter to trial within 120 days, the charges need not be
dismissed.

On appeal, a trial court's factual findings in this

regard should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.
State v. Trujillo 656
When the delay --

•: •"

" - matter did not result

fiopn t ho p n o •" ut "•»'»'' actions or inactions, this Court has
consistently upheld <. . ower court's finding ot 'good cause." See
State v, Stillings, 709 P.2d 348, 349 (Utah 1985) (defense
::o\ insel mar

i t€ reqi lest for d i scover j ) ; State v. Tr~ ,ino, 656

P.2d 403, 404 (Utah 1982)(per curiam) (codefendant changing plea
from guilty to not guilty); State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115, 1 16
(Utah ] 9 8 ? ) | <Je J end*?«\ i i ei \ uus t e« I con tin u.;» 111"' \
B a n n e r , 7 1 7 P,2d 1"J2*.»

In S t a t e -

1327-28 (Utah 1986), this Court explained

that four factors are helpful in conducting a speedy trial
analysis:
delay;

(I ) i, lie' Lengi.h of; delay; | il | i he reasons tor L lie
j defendant's assertion of his right; and (4) the

prej -

^fendant.
In the present case, Judge Bunnell

cause

* soundly based.

First, he found that the delay in trial
• ire trial counsel -,r

was
the arraignment hearing held
148-4 9 | (see Appendices
1"

^

September 6
•

d 1

n

9P9 ':

Atrial date o1 February
defends ill din I counsel

sufficient time to reconcile their differences, and if not to
allow
Second

counsel sufficient time to prepare for trial (Id.
.; : e Hunnel II louiiil thfil defeiiddid ^ived the l ?(c i

statutory period by failing to object to the trial setting when
asked it I hi IIHM

* au acceptable (

7-1R, 149). Third, ho

found that the delay in conducting the trial was noi: a itosu.lt >t

the actions or inactions of the prosecution (R. 119, 149-50).
Finally, he found that defendant was not prejudiced by the delay
where the delay was reasonable, defendant was concurrently
incarcerated on a separate matter, and there was no allegation of
staleness of the evidence or unavailability of witnesses as a
result of the delay (R. 118, 147-50).
Defendant cites State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361, 453
P.2d 158 (1969), for the proposition that he had no affirmative
duty after filing his request for disposition to pursue a trial,
that he may stand silent without waiving his statutory speedy
trial right, and that the lower court lost jurisdiction upon
expiration of the time period.

However, Wilson interpreted the

predecessor statute to § 77-29-1 which removed the jurisdiction
of the state courts upon expiration of the time period.
Cede Ann. § 77-65-1 (1953) (repealed 1980).

See Utah

Unlike the present

statute, the statute in Wilson did not permit judicial discretion
to determine whether or not "good cause" existed for the delay.
Id.

Thus, Wilson is unhelpful to defendant where good cause

existed for the delay as contemplated under the current statute.
Finally, defendant argues that the delay was
unreasonable because new counsel could have been appointed at the
time of the arraignment, allowing the trial to be held within 120
days.

However, this Court rejected a similar claim in State v.

Bullock, 699 P.2d 753 (Utah 1985).

In Bullock, defense counsel

became ill on the date set for trial.

Id. at 756.

Defendant

requested his counsel be dismissed and expressed a willingness to
proceed pro se.

Id.

The trial court denied his request and set

,i ti'iiil date beyond the statutory period.

Id,

This Court

affirmed the trial court 1 s finding tha t t:l le de.Lay wain reas enable
and supported by good cause,

iu

Analogously, Judge Bunnell did

not. rihuso his- .:l.i seret 1 nn i in , i acting g
delay where defendant

(

cause existed for the

• : defense counsel required ai 1 oppc )i: tui :i i t y

for reconciliation.
POINT II
JUDGE BUNNELL DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION
IN FINDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
DISQUALIFICATION TO BE UNTIMELY.
D(;j I endant ui'xl a r q u H i--' * ha 1 In d«\servep a new **
since Judge Bunnell was prejudiced against him.

Allegedly, Judge

Bunnell had prosecuted defendant in October 1973, and recused
2
himself I n another trial involving detei idai it i n December 1 981
(R

65-6 6) (see Appendix ' , Motion).

Judge Bunnell denied

elef endai i I: "" s i:eques 1: t 1: Iat he recuse himself because it was
untimely, having been made the morning of t r ^ ,
Appendix

M

:

207) (see

E " ; Transcript).
Defendant arknowJftdqes-iin his hi let" that: Rule 2 9 ( c ) ,

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, required him I

H i e the

request for disqualification "as soon as practicable after the
case lids beei'i assigned nn I in1 I.Mas or pi f- judicip is known ' (Brief
of App. at I ')

However, defendant claims that the rule contains

no sanction for failing to comply.

Icl.

Defendant is mistaken.

The fact that a judge previously prosecuted a defendant does
not necessarily require that the judge be disqualified. State v,
Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Utah), cert, denied, Belt v Utah,
487 U.S. 1220 (1988).

Rule 12(d), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that the M[f]ailure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or
objections or to make requests which must be made prior to trial
or at the time set by the court shall constitute waiver thereof,
but the court for cause shown may grant relief from such waiver."
As this Court noted in a civil case, "While the Utah rule imposes
no specific time limitation on the filing of a motion for
disqualification, timeliness is still essential."

Madsen v.

Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan, 767 P.2d 538, 543 (Utah 1988).3

The

Madsen Court went on to note, "To be timely, a motion to
disqualify should be filed at counsel's first opportunity after
learning of the disqualification facts.

Only if good cause for a

delay is demonstrated in the motion seeking disqualification
should a delinquent notice even be considered."

Id.

In the instant case, defendant first appeared before
Judge Bunnell on September 6, 1989 (R. 12). Yet, he waited until
February 15, 1990, the morning scheduled for trial, to bring his
motion for disqualification (R. 65-66) (see Appendix "D";
Motion).

When approached with the motion, Judge Bunnell ruled as

follows:
THE COURT: Well, let the record show
that this motion was handed to me fifteen
minutes after the time fixed for the
commencement of the trial, and after I had
already qualified the general jury panel. So
the court rules that it is not timely filed,
and the Court cannot grant it at this time,
to waste the entire time of the Court without
it having been filed sometime prior so the
In Madsen, the Court construed rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, which is substantially the same as rule 29(c), Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Court could i ntelligently rule on it. Ana a.^
constitutes an undue delay of the trial as it
would be an abuse of the judicial system i f T
were to grant that at this late date.
Anything else?
(l*

,lf|

'

I^}

AI'H'IK'J

" i TraiiHC- i

Even if defense counsel did not know

••«. -.- sis added).
f

^he alleged

disqualification facts, defendant certainly did,
demons ti at. ed nn

ijucid

Defendant

-lusf' as l:o wh\ Judg*- Bunne.! I shou Id have

considered the motion at such a late stage?.
acted properly in summarily disposing

Thus, the judge

" defendant's motion filed

after the commencement of tri a]

.-:*.**. ^: ,,. «-*• n . t

: defendant i - suspend a trial by filing a belated motion to
-.3 i :

' • '

3 1 maneuver.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully asks
this
case tc the u \ai
4
sentence.

court with instructions K

correct defendant's

v^2
DATED this

day of October, 1990.
R#

P A U L

V A N

D A M

Attorney General

r T.ADC1?M
DAN RTLARSEN
Assistant Attorney General

See note .1 infra.
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APPENDIX B

FILED
IN THE SEVDTH JUDICAL D'STniCT COURT
Of UTAH IN £%C F ^ ' ' ' ^ v r o

MAR 11930
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

BR"CF. C FUNK Clark
&&T

IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

]
1
]
I
1

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
REGARDING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS

1

Criminal No. 946

BRYON D. PETERSEN,
DOB 04/21/45
Defendant.

This matter

having been before the Court on the 14th day of

February, 1990, for hearing
with the

on

Motion

to Dismiss,

Defendant and his counsel, Keith H. Chiara and Allen S.

Thorpe, present, and the State
County Attorney,

and

being

represented

by

the Emery

Scott Johansen, and also being present; and the

Court having reviewed the
subject;

Defendant's

having

various

also

heard

memoranda

submitted

on this

oral arguments, the Court now

makes the following findings and conclusions:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Notice for Disposition of Pending

the Defendant

in this

matter did

Charges filed by

not specify the nature of the

pending charges or the court wherein they were pending.
2.

The County Attorney received

the

Notice

sent

by the

Defendant.
3.

The Court received no notice whatsoever.

4.

The Court

asked Defendant and defense counsel at trial

setting on September 6f

1989, whether

the dates

of February 15

Deputy

and 16f 1990, were acceptable to them; and neither the Defendant,
nor defense counsel, objected to that setting.
5.
specific

The delay between arraignment and the trial was for the
purpose

of

allowing

problems with his counsel.

A

Defendant to solve any potential
trial

before

Defendant

and his

counsel had reconciled their differences or determined that their
relationship must be severed would

not

have

been

in

the best

interest of the Defendant.
6.

There has

been no

of staleness of evidence

or

evidence submitted by the Defendant
unavailability

of

witnesses

as a

result of the delay in trial.
7.

The Defendant

has been

incarcerated at the Utah State

Prison since the filing of charges herein as
his

parole

revoked,

which

is

a result

of having

not part of the case before the

Court at this time.
8.

Due

to

caseload,

a

normal

trial

setting

in

this

District, assuming no necessity exists for a more remote setting,
is 90 to 120

days,

absent

objection

or

incarceration

of the

Defendant as a result of a pending charge.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The form

sent to

requesting disposition

the County Attorney by the Defendant

of pending

charges does

not comply with

Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-29-1.
2.

Strict compliance with Section 77-29-1 is not required,

and the Notice to the County Attorney was

sufficient to

put the

County Attorney upon notice.

2

Recorded in Judgment Repord
—Ju
at Page .A 62,

3.

The delay

granted on September 6, 1989 was done within

the statutory 120-day period.
4.

The delay in

commencing

the

trial

was

a reasonable

continuance for good cause shown.
5.

Failure to

object to the trial setting at the arraign-

ment amounted to waiver of the statutory right to a

trial within

120 days on the part of the Defendant.
6.

The Defendant

has the

try a case prior

to

the

period

in

prejudice

resulted

burden to

expiration
to

of

show that failure to
the

statutory 120-day

the Defendant or in tactical

advantage to the prosecution.
7.

In this case, no prejudice to the Defendant or tactical

advantage to the prosecution has been shown by the Defendant.
8.

The delay

in conducting

the trial did not result from

actions or inaction by the prosecution.
Defendant's Motion to
this trial

will be

Dismiss

is,

therefore,

denied, and

heard beginning at 9i30 a.m. on February 15,

1990.
DATED this s^S

day of February, 1990.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the j^t: day of f'ttiTuliZyT 1990, I
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law Regarding Defendant's Motion to Dismiss by
depositing same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to
Defendant's attorney as followsi

Recorded in Judgment Record

Keith H. Chiara
Attorney at Law
P. 0. Box 955
Price, Utah 84501
Allen S. Thorpe
Attorney at Law
P. 0. Box 1238
Castle Dale, Utah

84513

Secretary
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APPENDIX C

Yes.

Trujillo and Smith.

It was Smith that showed up and

said he had changed his mind.
MR. JOHANSEN:

That's correct.

And the

holding in the Smith case —
THE COURT: Well, the most recent case was in
1982, and we haven't had it in the Supreme Court since.
That's why I'm familiar with that case. Well, gentlemen, of
course, the Trujillo case does give us some indication.

Mr.

Thorpe, when you talk about an argument of speedy trial,
10

that's all this argument is about.

II

legislature's attempt
trial.
trial —

Because this was the

to say what constitutes a speedy

They say that if the notice is given for the speedy
they say it must be held within 120 days.

That's

what the legislature says is constitutional as to a speedy
trial.

And that's all this is. When it's indicated in the

Trujillo opinion whether or not there's good cause to go beyond
that, is discretionary with the Court.

And even on review,

all the Supreme Court will do is 'see whether I abused that
discretion in setting the case beyond the 120 days; my
20

abusing

it,

taking

into

account

the

totality

the

21

circumstance.

22

that was filed by Mr. Petersen is not in compliance with the

23

statute, because the statute says it will name what Court

24

the case is pending in.

25

case is pending in.

And in this case, it's true that the form

This does not say what Court the

It just says in Emery County.

Of

19
me MuMelman
iftrd Court Tranacnbrr

course, we have three courts; four counting the JP Court,
which we don't consider.

But anyway, it also says it will

say what the charge is.

This doesn't say.

It just says:

"all charges." So you don't have any strict compliance with
the statute as far as the form is concerned.

But I don't

think the statute necessarily requires strict interpretation
as long as the county attorney received it.

Of course, we

have another problem here where the statute says the warden
or his agent there at the prison will send a copy to the
10

clerk, for obvious reasons.

11

it's on file.

12

know that —

That's so the Court will know

There's no copy.

In other words, I don't

there's nothing there to show the clerk ever

13

got it.

At least it's not in the file.

And the circuit

14

court sends over every pleading that's in their file, and we

15

have that, and there's no notice in the file.

16

didn't know, and the Court didn't know it at the time it

17

came up for trial setting.

18

wasn't aware, and the Court wasn'.t aware of it, also.

19

course, Mr. Johansen admits he was aware of it and he got a

20

copy of it.

21

maybe that's enough.

So the clerk

And when Mr. Thorpe says he
Of

So maybe there's a partial compliance, and
So, we do have those violations.

22

But the Court is of the opinion this is kind of a

23

statute that does not require absolute etched-in-stone type

24

of compliance, as long as there is a notice and there is

2$

reasonable effort to try to reach that goal, that there's

20
me MitMelman
tfwd Court Transcriber

A

A WM

obligation on both sides to see that he is entitled to his
constitutional right of a speedy trial.

And when it comes

to affixing absolutely 120 days as the absolute cut off, of
course, that's not what the statute says.
say for good cause.

0£ course, they

It can go beyond that for good reason.

For good reason it can go beyond that.

And particularly

—

although it's not dealt with at any length in that Trujillo
case, which is the most recent pronouncement on it —
least that

I could

find

--

at

But as it indicates here,

10

assuming that notice was sent as alleged, that the 120 days

II

has expired —

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

nevertheless, this appeal fails because the

discretion vested in the trial court on such matters and
I've got this case before me -- and in the instant case, the
delay did not result from the prosecution's actions or —
any event the delay was reasonable.
to look at:

So that's what I have

was the delay going beyond the 120 days of this

case reasonable?
reasonable.

in

Of course, the Court does find that it is

Because

at

the time Mr. Peterson

appeared

before the Court for the trial setting, the C£urt asked him

20

specifically —

and his counsel if the dates in February

21

were agreeable.

And although the Court did not get a direct

22

answer at the time, that's when Mr. Petersen asked the Court

21

to discharge Mr. Thorpe and get him additional counsel. And

24

I knew if that was to take place, then you're going to get

25

new counsel at that date, and there's no way we could set it

21
une MtiMelman
Shed Court Transcriber

within

an^ still get mui i«

120 da^

investigage and start nv&r

nn

.- * suggested

;ounsel, who would
^

invpstiqation and

that date

•*

>*

course,
supplied

t-

said at that time

- >

»

Court

statement

•

M

asked:
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t h e
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rela.^c
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".c tnei> aT y crier* j;
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*

W.li,

-ir

> u

consider whether

- i apply 1

10
report from them, perhaps he *.

i %

Thorpe receive

mean?

*v was parti

13

4

Petersen t:»

16

o^

'1C b L l l l

V

fmm

Petersen it . ^ ,

Mr-

assume -ie

- *

*

- :-iev nor.

-n

we

i*

other

because

problems v

y

-3*

*T••

Thorpe

object,

>e continuance

Finn I

19

Petersen s preseni

us!ody •
I

•

prejudice

-

21
22

liberty

* • •

<

A'as
>-*

!

\

,n

anythinq ni that sor t was concerned which would
delay was not reasonable.

nothing on

^

words,

delaying

24
2S

•

, .luumstances

the part

There was

of the prosecution, either by way of

22
Bine MtiMelmaii
rofwd Court In

inn nr inaction that delayed the tria 1
course

consideration

takin

Not only that,
the Court 's
Jc-y

etting

from

:ht-r words, until we r-J give
uji±e&^> there

-ptt * r

was not i- custody pursuant to
although
rison,

custody •+

w-i-

.e

~ a*

^tate

ou there
-i • where ^° *a*

waiting trie

*** .

n.- defendant

.,.~toay

•;. *• - DV<- a preference t

&i

delay this trx^ . , ar

:he

considering
:

..;

; nothinc

v,

defendant was asked if those dates were agreeable because he
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(jijiis*-1! and w* *< It that would

give *i' sufiicient Lime

*roi'l« ' MI < those problems, and

because '

least at that hearing he knpw
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21
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24
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25

had

finding
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course, the statute says the prison
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defendant's duty.
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S o , we can

• L.

clerk.

-ha-

That's

not

the

a g a i n s t him.

Sc

.he

I
4

Dismiss.

5

t h*-- M -fin ';> Sever.

6

iluhrinsen.'

i

HI

THE COURT:

THE COURT.'

The Motion to Sever arises out oi

iill M

M

:he issue

«

I

T

0HANSEN
.

i lirii and othei cases; the

'I IM; ninni i-1 ami t-n im.

general nature of relevamy

14
15

Okay.

case.

12
13

i wish t o make one p o i n t a b o u t

MR. JOHANSEN:

10
the Saunders

ftr*' ',"<", M>

Hi in i r .

9

II

You're nee o b j e c t i n g t o t h a t ,

MR. JOHANSEN.
l h 11

to

Now, we have one o t h e r m o t i o n , g e n t l e m e n / and t h a t ' s

7
8

Motion

.1" e^'e'i-y case that deals with

facts

in existence:

one was the

16
defendan

17
18

-

defendant testifies, all

testify.
•

-

Because

i.* • '.<•-

going uu L U U K IUI

19
20

defendant

waiving his right to testify at trial.
THE COURT:

21

Johansen.

, of crnir.si', I d< •

2

v i m i IMI , MI

21

down and make him make that choice at this time,

25

I don't think we have ... . . lim

OHANSEN:

24
there's no reason

•£

ln> ijoc),

testily

IliPn

sever.

24
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APPENDIX D

FILED
IN TH.f SEVENTH JUD'C.'.L P i S ' ^ T COURT
OF UTAH If, AND rc:i >f.;rr. -r\

FEB 1 G 1930
BF.UCE C PUNK

ALLEN S. THORPE #3254
Emery County Public Defender
98 East Main Street
Castle Dale, Utah 84SI s
(801) 381-5110

qv

_ __

do*

\-_'T^

Deputy

Attorney for the Defendant
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY f STATE OF UTAH
)

THE STATE OF UTAH f
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)

)
BRYON D. PETERSEN,
Defendant,

MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION
OF JUDGE
Criminal No. ^ Y < ^

)

)

3 t JDGE BOYD BUNNELL

)

Conies
enLittied
of

now

I'eteiteiif

the

a c t i o n , a n d in a c c o r d a n c e

with

Rule

Him

\ out i t o h a v e

Criminal

Boyd

Bunnell

hiyui

0.

P r o c e d u r e , I n . A , move:
recusr

Def endarl
^ e ? • I :r
fnilowing:
i - Judge Boyd
. \M
1Q7^. far

Innineli,

Foil

defendant

luan

1hi

prosecuted
ift»e of race

anil

rantinn

in

tin

above

2 9 . ( • ) , iu.ah

the J u d g e ,

predudice

hv

Rules

towards

fit jf m q

the

Dei endant , on in about
. \\w Seventh Judicial
:h 11 i'onv i cf I i 'in handed

down.
2. Judge Boyd Bunne] 1 recused himself from presiding over a
tri a] against Defendant on December, *>*> - I Q A T - Judge Don Tibbs
was asigned the trial i i i 1 lis place.
Therefore Defendant prays that this Motion be granted for
the substantial reasons so stated.

Pag i

DATED th !./£*•day of February,- 1990'.

Allen S. Thorpi
Attorney for Defendant
VERIFICATION
being first du

"!,"i i; undersigned,
~,,
deposes and states:
] That he siegned 1111: foregoing motion,
2 T ha t t he £ act ua 1 assertations co ntained herein ar e t r ue
to the best of hi s knowledge, information ^ belief.

hrtyfrn &) LM
Bryon D, Petersen

Signed
February.

and

sworn

1,0

before

his

WfflSJ^

Uilo^
NOTARY PUBLIC

/ tj

day

of

Page 3
CERTIFICATE Ql S E M 1 C E
I hereby certify that I served a LLV
the foregoing hQIlQB

TQ DISQUALIFY JUDGE un

Emery County Attorneyf

by

delivering the sair>

the Emery C'ounty Courthouse9 Castle Dale
of February, 1990.
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APPENDIX E

THE C O U R T :
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' J record show that

*—

minutes after
T1

tixeo I'M the commencement
already qualified

t h e general

'A1:

*n

jury p a n e l .

Mil*-", ill i! i-.

C O U 1(1

d

^. n.t. Court

w a s t e t h e entire time ^ f *

.

Hi having been

* wirt

filed sometime prior so ti.e Lnurt

II I 111 I' 1 J 1 (.|«

delay of the t

siu

it cannot grant

• l al this ti *
without

•- time

I

=. o-

b e an abuse

-

system il i weie Lv^ ^ a n i tnau av, w,*.-w * A - G

aa, , a
Anythin_,

e i, t "

MR

CHIARA:

THE COURT:
MR

Y e s , Your Honor-

.a

.-

wr iting, M r . Ch i d t• a /"'

CHIARA,: Nr»,

imely m a d e , a n d doesn • *. .

change of venu€

Rules UL u v u Procedure
that
system.

Thirdly, we

*

t appears t

t

. *.
hf

it's m e r e ] v an a11

Anything else?
T

rfIARA:

A

Moti m /< >r Mistrial,

Your

Hu

22 !

based upon t h e adverse inferences of jurors that have bee

2|

dismissed a n d statements m a d e .

24

25

I

i

c a n t 1 >e a m i s t r i a l .

11 11'

ii

i

I

"' i tw™1 1 'i

iiiii/i Jfl

- *

W e haven't even h a d a trial yet
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